Trump-Kim Summit & Regional Stakes

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CWA # 99, 18 March 2019
Trump-Kim Summit & Regional Stakes
For China, its a sigh of relief

  Harini Madhusudan

China wants good relations with both Koreas, to keep the US off balance on the Korean peninsula, and preserve a relatively stable border in its northeast.

Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

 

After the failure in Hanoi to reach an understanding, a good part of the world looked to China to seek their position. From Singapore to Hanoi, what has been China’s response to Trump- Kim interactions? What would be China's stance, if DPRK would go ahead and test another missile?

China’s security concern in this context primarily revolves around stability around its northeastern borders. Hence China supports the idea of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Safety and security of the DPRK's nuclear programme has been a worry for China which was reflected in its response to the September 2017 on-site collapse of the sixth nuclear test of North Korea. Concerns were raised over radioactive spills, specifically because most North Korean nuclear facilities are located in the western parts of the country, which are in proximity to China’s border cities. North Korea is also the centrepiece of strategic competition between China and the United States.


No Deal: Where does China stand?

China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, remarked on the sidelines of the annual National People’s Congress in Beijing. “Considering the complexities of decades of slow progress on ridding the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons, the problem can not be solved overnight.” He added: "Achievable goals and breaking the cycle of mistrust are the key to solving this decades-old problem and China is willing to continue to play a constructive role".  The failure to strike a deal ensures that things remain as they are, and China remains an important power of influence in the region. But the security challenges will remain if the tensions between Pyongyang and Washington continue this path.

The above statement highlights that China is playing safe. This may be counterproductive to China’s hopes of playing an instrumental role in the security of the Korean Peninsula. Because, in this present scenario, Trump expects DPRK to assume all of his demands at his will, this means that North Korea will require one or several brokers who can help address its demands to help protect them. China is apt for this. But Beijing unsure if North Korea will be interested in Chinese security guarantees knowing that China is also fighting a diplomatic challenge with the United States at this point.

 

Singapore and Hanoi Summits, and China: A Brief Note

Beijing certainly does not want to see the escalation of the nuclear programme. North Korea’s attempts with Hanoi and the meeting in Singapore on 12 June 2018, relieved much of the pressure that was laid on China. Beijing is very keen on preserving the current ‘positive’ atmosphere surrounding issues related to North Korea. This could also be because China’s response to the North Korea nuclear crisis primarily focuses on its management of relations with United States. After the failure of the summit, China should not have taken a neutral position.

For Kim Jong Un’s trip, China has ensured Kim’s security as he traveled for both Singapore and Hanoi. For the first summit in Singapore, Kim flew on a chartered jet that Beijing provided. This time he was given an escort across the country, in a limousine. He is also said to have met the Chinese leader, after both the summits and submitted a report. Both of these show that the Chinese leadership is keen on ensuring that the interaction between the two leaders remains exclusive and smooth.

The remarks that were expressed after the summit was called a failure, shows China's intention to pursue better bilateral ties while standing firm on denuclearisation and the existing sanctions. This represents China’s carefully calculated choice of staying away from directly taking part in the negotiations. China’s official positioned outlook has taken many analysts by surprise, because these remarks can only help strengthen the public perception to an extent. But, China’s optimism also indicates a sense of contentment that the regional status-quo remains the same.

 

In case of further instability…

China places a higher priority on the long-term stability in the region, meaning weak ROK-US relations. While eventual progress remains a priority to all parties, China currently does not have any incentive to compel North Korea to take any action. This is also parallel with its own ongoing negotiations on the ‘Trade War,’ it would not want to put its relations with the United States at risk.

China, however, continues its close economic ties with North Korea. China’s role will remain irreplaceable. What comes in the months following the failure, will remain crucial. China cannot ignore the fact that North Korea is rebuilding a missile launch site. Neither can China ignore that Trump is in his last days of presidency and he might want to use North Korea as his personal victory. If DPRK were to test another missile, it is unlikely that China would change its current stance. This is because, the imbalances in US and DPRK relations are not new to China, failure of negotiations between the two have happened before.  China hence does not benefit from the current stalemate. If Hanoi was successful, it would have been successful in the absence of China. With very few options left, China would choose to remain the balancer.

Recent developments, such as direct interactions between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the United States, have benefited China by toning down the prospect of war. China wants good relations with both Koreas, to keep the US off balance on the Korean peninsula, and preserve a relatively stable border in its northeast. This stability they want in which China is the key player in determining the region’s fate.

 

China and North Korea: A Brief History

China has been criticised in the past for its perceived responsibility of North Korea’s actions. China has defended North Korea in the past. In 1961, the two countries signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Here China pledged to render immediate military and other assistance in case of a foreign attack. The treaty has been prolonged two times, in 1981 and 2001, its current validity is till 2021.

Since 2003, China has been part of the six-party talks that were aimed at resolving the nuclear weapons programme issue of North Korea. China ‘resolutely’ opposed the 2013 North Korean nuclear test. In 2016, the tensions between China and North Korea grew right after the North Korean Nuclear test in January. China, “strongly urge the DPRK side to remain committed to its denuclearisation commitment…” By 24 February 2016, the United States and China introduced new sanctions against the North Korean regime conducted under the context of the UN.

In 2017, there was a visible negative turn in the relations after the North Korean state media directly attacked China on at least 3 occasions. China is North Korea’s single largest trading partner. About 90% of North Korea ’s trade is with China and they had imposed sanctions on DPRK.  But 2018 saw over 4 interactions between Chinese leadership and Kim Jong Un, and it is safe to assume that there is an improvement in relations.

There was a significant change in the relations between the ‘communist’ neighbours, over Pyongyang’s repeated nuclear provocations where Beijing decided to support the Washington-led UN economic trade sanctions. But in the past year, China has shown flexibility on easing the sanctions in exchange for North Korea’s willingness to take steps to give up its nuclear weapons, retaining China’s reputation of North Korea’s main diplomatic and economic backer. China still has the potential to a unique influence over the denuclearisation issue in the region.

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